A Minimal Libertarianism: Free Will And The Promise Of Reduction

In "A Minimal Libertarianism: Free Will And The Promise Of Reduction," Christopher Evan Franklin presents a new version of event-causal libertarianism, which combines the beliefs that humans can act freely and that these actions are caused by non-deterministic processes, with agency reductionism, which states that the role of the agent in free will is solely determined by their mental states and events. Franklin argues that this view is superior to a similar theory proposed by philosopher Robert Kane. He also challenges the idea that event-causal libertarians have no advantage over compatibilists in terms of securing a valuable kind of freedom and responsibility. Franklin suggests that by adopting the most plausible compatibilist theory and adding indeterminism at the right moment, a minimal event-causal libertarianism can be achieved, which combines the simplicity of compatibilism with the intuitive power of libertarianism. However, Franklin also acknowledges a potential problem with his assumption of agency reductionism, which could ultimately undermine both event-causal libertarianism and compatibilism.

In this book, Christopher Evan Franklin develops and defends a novel version of event-causal libertarianism. This view is a combination of libertarianism--the view that humans sometimes act freely and that those actions are the causal upshots of nondeterministic processes--and agency reductionism--the view that the causal role of the agent in exercises of free will is exhausted by the causal role of mental states and events (e.g., desires and beliefs) involving the agent. Franklin boldly counteracts a dominant theory that has similar aims, put forth by well-known philosopher Robert Kane.

Many philosophers contend that event-causal libertarians have no advantage over compatibilists when it comes to securing a distinctively valuable kind of freedom and responsibility. To Franklin, this position is mistaken. Assuming agency reductionism is true, event-causal libertarians need only adopt the most plausible compatibilist theory and add indeterminism at the proper juncture in the genesis of human action. The result is minimal event-causal libertarianism: a model of free will with the metaphysical simplicity of compatibilism and the intuitive power of libertarianism. And yet a worry remains: toward the end of the book, Franklin reconsiders his assumption of agency reductionism, arguing that this picture faces a hitherto unsolved problem. This problem, however, has nothing to do with indeterminism or determinism, or even libertarianism or compatibilism, but with how to understand the nature of the self and its role in the genesis of action. Crucially, if this problem proves unsolvable, then not only is event-causal libertarianism untenable, so also is event-causal compatibilism.