Repeated Games

This book is a comprehensive account of the theory of repeated games, which is one of the most important branches of game theory. The book is remarkable on many counts, including its coverage, its sharp and concise proofs, and its sophisticated and illuminating discussions. It is not an easy book, but the reader who puts in the work to master it will be handsomely rewarded by a deep understanding not only of repeated games, but of all of game theory.

Three leading experts have produced a landmark work based on a set of working papers published by the Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) at the Universite Catholique de Louvain in 1994 under the title 'Repeated Games', which holds almost mythic status among game theorists. Jean-Francois Mertens, Sylvain Sorin and Shmuel Zamir have significantly elevated the clarity and depth of presentation with many results presented at a level of generality that goes far beyond the original papers - many written by the authors themselves. Numerous results are new, and many classic results and examples are not to be found elsewhere. Most remain state of the art in the literature. This book is full of challenging and important problems that are set up as exercises, with detailed hints provided for their solutions. A new bibliography traces the development of the core concepts up to the present day. Review: 'In the early 1990s, Jean-Francois Mertens, Sylvain Sorin, and Shmuel Zamir collaborated on a series of deep papers on repeated games, which, unfortunately, they never published. Happily, this book at long last makes their important and still highly pertinent work widely accessible.' Eric Maskin, Nobel Laureate in Economics, Harvard University 'This work is a landmark in the scholarship of game theory. The results and proofs in this text are the foundations on which modern repeated-game theory is built. It is not only the outstanding coverage of foundational material that makes this text one of a kind; it is the generality and the breadth of vision that are its most special features. The series of working papers on which this text is based already has the status of folklore among game theorists. Many of us have known and used the working-paper version of this volume for our entire research careers. This work is unique and remarkable and will continue to be thought so fifty years from today.' Martin Cripps, University College London 'This book, by three of the foremost experts in the field, presents a comprehensive account of the theory of repeated games - one of the most important branches of game theory. The book is remarkable on many counts. It provides a unified point of view for a host of results, some seemingly disparate. The theorems are given in their most general form, and the proofs are sharp and concise. The discussions, while brief, are sophisticated and illuminating. This is not an easy book. But the reader who puts in the work to master it will be handsomely rewarded by a deep understanding not only of repeated games, but of all of game theory.' Elon Kohlberg, Royal Little Professor of Business Administration, Harvard Business School 'This wonderful book is essential reading for graduate students and researchers in game theory, both as a textbook and as a reference. It contains a wealth of results that cannot be found elsewhere. An instant classic.' Johannes Horner, Yale University 'The study of long-term interactions - 'repeated games' - is one of the most fascinating, and fruitful, areas of research in game theory. The content of this volume - with its outstanding coverage, both broad and deep, and written by the leading experts - has long been regarded as the 'bible' of this area. It is high time that it be made widely available in book form.' Sergiu Hart, Alice Kusiel and Kurt Vorreuter University Professor, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem