Description
This book addresses the various problems associated with finding a philosophically satisfying account of mathematical proof. It brings together many of the most notable figures currently writing on this issue, in the field of philosophy of mathematics, in an attempt to explain why it is that mathematical proof is given prominence over other forms of mathematical justification. The difficulties that arise in accounts of proof range from the rightful role of logical inference and formalization to questions concerning the place of experience in proof and the possibility of eliminating impredictive reasoning from proof. The companion volume Proof, Knowledge and Mathematics is also available from Routledge. Contributors: David Aeurbach, John P. Burgess, Michael Detlefsen, Glen Helman, Daniel Isaacson, Charles Parsons, Richard Tieszen, David S, Tragesser. This book should be of interest to advanced students and lecturers of philosophy, philosophy of logic and the philosophy of mathematics.
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