The Business Of War

This is a major new approach to the military revolution and the relationship between warfare and the power of the state in early modern Europe. Whereas previous accounts have emphasised the growth of state-run armies during this period, David Parrott argues instead that the delegation of military responsibility to sophisticated and extensive networks of private enterprise reached unprecedented levels. This included not only the hiring of troops but their equipping, the supply of food and munitions, and the financing of their operations. The book reveals the extraordinary prevalence and capability of private networks of commanders, suppliers, merchants and financiers who managed the conduct of war on land and at sea, challenging the traditional assumption that reliance on mercenaries and the private sector results in corrupt and inefficient military force. In so doing, the book provides essential historical context to contemporary debates about the role of the private sector in warfare. Review: 'David Parrott's sparkling and deeply-considered study is a seminal contribution to the history of warfare and government in all periods, and reveals that 'military outsourcing' was normal long before the Iraq War brought it into the headlines. Highly original in argument and notably lively in presentation, it will become a modern classic.' Hamish Scott, University of Glasgow 'David Parrott deftly explores the various shades of grey in the public private partnership between early modern state and military entrepreneurs. He proves that more often than not private enterprise simply did perform more efficiently than the state.' Lothar Hobelt, University of Vienna 'This splendid survey prompts many further questions ... but the history of early modern warfare will never look the same again.' History Today 'This is an extremely important book. It marks a major reevaluation of almost everything we have believed about warfare in early modern Europe. It is not a picture of technology-driven change (though Parrott is aware of the significance of such innovations as the flintlock musket and ring bayonet), but instead a clear-eyed and unsentimental thesis showing how administrative and economic developments pushed warfare along specific lines. ... The range of Parrott's scholarship - especially in the German literature - is prodigious; the footnotes alone are worth the price of admission. Military historians will doubtless debate the details for some time to come, but that is the point: all subsequent work in early modern military history will have to take into account the Parrott thesis.' Renaissance Quarterly