Description
Why do the conventions that enable society to cohere survive, even when it is not in everyone's interests to obey them? The book is about how the rules and institutions which are the basis of co-operation in society can be systematically explained. The social sciences which have concerned themselves with this question have frequently come up with opposite explanations, neither of which seem adequate. Economics, with its emphasis on individual choice seems unable to account for individuals following rules when it is not in their interest to do so. Sociology, which can explain such rule-following behaviour, struggles to account for purposeful individual action. In the place of such a stark opposition, Viktor J. Vanberg offers an analysis which cuts across traditional disciplinary boundaries between such fields as economics, law, moral philosophy, sociology and political science. Review: With Rules and Choice in Economics, Vanberg establishes himself as one of the foremost individualist social theoriests of his generation. There is much to profit from in this volume, and even more intellectual profits are to be reaped by those who pick up his challenge and explore the interplay between the order of rules and the order of actions. -Journal of Economic Behavior and Organiztion I am sure that the book will have a wide impact. It constitutes one of the most important analytical texts in the revival of modern institutional economics. The careful attention paid to Hayek and to evolutionary themes is especially welcome. -Geoff Hodgson, Cambridge University The book is a welcome contribution to recent efforts to rethink the behavioral foundations of social science. - Contemporary Sociology